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minister from July 20 ro D ecember 31, Smisky simulta-
neously became the last prime minister of the Czech and 
Slovak Federated Republic. Following the division of the 
country on January 1, 1993, Klaus became prime minister 
of cl1eCzech Republic. From 1993 ro 1995 Swiskywas 
minister of transporratio n. In 1995 he became minister 
of health. In February 1997, in an effort ro stave off the 
bankruptcy of rwo prime reaching medical facilities , 
Smisky imroduced controversial cost-curring and consol-
idating measures. 
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The Suategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) resulted 
in a treaty limiring antiballistic missile (ABM) sysrems 
and an agreement limiting srraregic offensive arms. These 
accords were signed on May 26, 1972, afrer rwo and a 
half years of negoriation berween the United Stares and 
me USSR. A number of "agreed statements" chat clarified 
specific provisions or pares of the negoriati ng hisrory were 
attached. 
The ABM Treary soughr ro preclude the developmenr 
of narional missile defense systems. This rreary is of un-
limired durarion bur allows either parry the righr ro wirh-
draw on six-months notice if ir believes irs narional in-
reresrs are jeopardized. 
Two ABM deployment areas were allowed for each na-
rion and were so resrrictive chat a nationwide ballistic mis-
sile defense system could nor be developed. Each side was 
allowed a system to defend its capiral and another ro pro-
recr an inrercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch 
sire. These systems must be at least 1,300 kilometers away 
from each ocher, and each could have one hundred inrer-
cepror missil es and one hundred launchers. New genera-
rions of early-warning radars may be deployed, but they 
musr be sited along the periphery of each counrry and 
directed ourward so as nor ro facilitate an ABM defense. 
As agreed, the ABM Treary is reviewed every five years. 
A protocol to this rreary was signed on July 3, 1974, 
reducing the number of ABM deployment areas ro one 
for each nation . The ABM Treary was criticized by con-
servatives in the United States for terminating the Safe-
guard ABM system, which was ro be deployed in rwelve I . ~canons throughout the United States ro protect ICBM 
Sites, and for erasing the U.S. lead in ABM research and 
development. It was further criticized for encouraging the 
Soviet Union to create a counterforce capability that 
threatened U .S. land-based deterrent forces. 
The agreement was to remain in force for five years, 
and was a stopgap measure to limit the offensive strategic 
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arms race while further negotiarions would be ca rried our 
under SALT II. Under this agreement, strategic land-
based ballisric missile launcher , includina d1o e und . r 
b 
construction were frozen at current level . Further, 
submarine-launched ballistic miss ile ( LBMs) ould be 
increased ro grea ter levels on ly if accompanied by the de-
struction of an equal number of older I BM or LBM 
launchers. Soviet strategic force ceiling levels wer set at 
1,618 ICBMs and 950 LBM (740 th n existed). U . . 
strategic force cei ling levels were set at 1,054 1 BMs and 
710 SLBMs (656 chen exi ted). 
Ald10ugh mobile ICBMs, mu.ltiple- indepcndendy-
targetable-reentry-vehicle (MIRV) ballisri missiles, and 
srrategic bomber , of which the United State enjoy d an 
advanrage, were not covered in the lnrerim Agr ement, it 
was criticized for conceding ro the USSR an advantage in 
strategic bal listic missile launchers in return for the co n-
rinuance of Easr-West arms control nego tiat ions. 
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Second stage of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II) 
berween the USSR and the Un ited rates. T he primary 
focus of these talks was the replacement of d1 e SALT I 
Interim Agreemenr of May 26, 1972, wirh a more com-
plete and balanced treary. 
These calks resulted in the signing on June 18, 1979, 
of a Treacy, Protocol , and Joint Statement of Principles 
rhar were never rarified by rhe U.S. Senate. Following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year, President Jimmy 
Carrer withdrew the rreary from Senate consideration, 
where ir had come under considerable opposition. The 
Reagan adm inistration, in turn , never resubmitted the 
rreary because of Soviet violations, such as the Krasno-
